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Abstract
In liberal thought, democracy is guaranteed by the unity of community and government. The community of citizens elects its
government according to political preferences. The government rules over the community with powers which are limited by
unalienable human, civil, and political rights. These assumptions have characterized Classical Liberalism, Revisionist Liberalism and
contemporary Neo-liberal theories. However, the assumed unity of community and government becomes problematic in Global
Post-Fordism. Recent research on the globalization of the economy and society has underscored the increasing inability of
nation-states to exercise power over their communities which, in turn, limits the ability of communities to express their will at the
nation-state level. The current phase of capitalism is characterized by socio-economic relations which transcend the jurisdictions of
nation-states and local spaces. This paper addresses the issue of the fracture of the unity of community and government by
introducing feature characteristics of Classical Liberalism, Revisionist Liberalism and Neo-liberalism. Moreover, it analyzes the
contribution of the theory of Re#exive Modernization which represents a novel attempt to rethink democracy within the liberal
tradition. The paper concludes that the inability of governments to control economic and non-economic environments creates a crisis
of representation which implies serious limits to liberal democracy. This situation is particularly important for rural regions as their
socio-economic development, and programs for its democratization have been historically based on the intervention of agencies of
and control by the nation-state. ( 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The betterment of the socio-economic conditions of
rural regions has been a central topic of debate in a var-
iety of disciplinary and interdisciplinary circles. In a sig-
ni"cant number of cases, this debate assumed the
establishment of democratic social relations. Indeed, for
a signi"cant portion of the 19th and 20th centuries dis-
courses about democracy revolved largely around two
opposing readings of its characteristics and content: Lib-
eralism and Marxism. The end of the cold war and
consequent talks about the unsurmountable limits of
Marxism (e.g., Fukuyama, 1992) left Liberalism as the
only viable context within which to conceptualize
democracy. Despite various and valiant attempts to de-
fend Marxism (e.g., Derrida, 1994; Kellner, 1995), its
association with the dissolved Soviet system appeared
too delegitimizing to allow it back into the realm of
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democratic alternatives. Even in settings where Soviet
socialism and Marxism were clearly considered two sep-
arate entities, the dissolution of the Soviet block largely
meant the disquali"cation of Marxism as a possible the-
ory of democracy.1
The triumph of Liberalism, however, has not been
followed by a signi"cant scrutiny of its limits. Discourses
about democracy often take for granted the assumptions
and conditions called for by classical and contemporary
forms of Liberalism. Indeed, analyses of works of liberal
thinkers, such as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill are signi"cantly absent from the copious
1This is the case of Western Europe's most powerful communist
party, the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI renounced its
Marxist roots and name for a new version anchored in the liberal
parliamentary form of democracy. The former PCI is now called New
Democratic Party of the Left. It is important also to note that through-
out its history the PCI maintained a strong distance from the reading of
Marx and strategies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(Spriano, 1967).
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production of social science papers, in general, and those
pertaining to rural issues in particular. These classical
works set the ground rules of liberal democracy and the
framework from which contemporary renderings of Lib-
eralism originated. In e!ect, in a situation in which Lib-
eralism is forcefully proposed as the dominant
framework for democratic discourses, its classical theor-
ists and its fundamental characteristics are regarded only
as footnote material in analyses probing the issue of
democracy in society and in its rural settings.
The "rst objective of this paper is to rectify this situ-
ation by introducing the basic tenets of Classical Liberal-
ism. This task is carried out through a succinct review of
the work of John Stuart Mill, arguably the most signi"-
cant representative of this current of social thought. Ad-
ditionally, more modern forms of Liberalism are
reviewed. In particular, a synopsis of the basic tenets of
Revisionist Liberalism and of Neo-Liberalism are pre-
sented. These tenets are examined in relations to the crisis
of 20th century Fordism (Antonio and Bonanno, 1996)
which, I argue, invalidates Liberalism's `assumption of
unitya, that is, the existence of the unity between the
community of citizens and their government.2
This unity is one of the most important aspects of
Liberal thinking and it is maintained by classical and
contemporary versions of Liberalism alike. However,
current literature on the development of Global
Post-Fordism * the socio-economic phase of mature
capitalism which emerged out of the crisis of Fordism
* underscores the fracture between community and gov-
ernment and the consequent crisis of representation.
More speci"cally, the nation-state is increasingly unable
to represent its citizens as its capacity to control and
regulate economic and non-economic environments is
greatly diminished. This situation implies limits to liberal
democracy and to attempts to improve the conditions of
society carried out theoretically and practically. The
analysis of these aspects constitutes the other focus of this
manuscript.
The above is particularly relevant for debates about
rural issues. Over the years, students of this topic have
been particularly concerned with the elimination of ob-
stacles to the improvement of rural regions' human and
natural environments. The State has been one of the
instruments often employed to carry out these tasks and,
through its agents and agencies, it has played a promin-
ent role in shaping the current conditions of rural areas.
2 In this work the concepts of government and State are employed
interchangeably. Though the current usage of these words involves
di!erences, classical theorists employed the concept of government in
a much broader way than contemporary uses. It was much closer to the
meanings expressed by the contemporary concept of the State. Here,
government and the State are employed to indicate the political appar-
atus, its agents, and agencies.
Indeed, many rural studies and programs assumed the
existence of unchallenged State powers within a given
national territory which could be employed to satisfy
social and individual needs. At a time when signi"cant
changes are occurring at the socio-economic level and
when State powers seem increasingly inadequate to rep-
resent its community of citizens and address societal
concerns, attempts which scrutinize liberal democracy's
limits appear overdue. Equally relevant is the current
e!ort to rede"ne rurality. Calls to overcome the crisis of
rural regions and to establish emancipatory processes
assume the de"nition and construction of new forms of
rurality which contemplate enhanced participation of
local residents and communities in decision-making pro-
cesses. This posture is often articulated in terms of com-
munities and citizens' ability to a!ect the formation and
implementation of local, national and now supranational
policies and implies a notion of democracy which is
"rmly anchored in liberal readings of social and political
actions. In this context, the issues of democracy and the
availability of its liberal forms emerge as central in the
process of de"ning the space of rural regions in the global
society.
The paper opens with a presentation of the tenets of
Classical Liberalism which is followed by the illustration
of the most salient aspects of Revisionist Liberalism and
Neo-liberalism. The subsequent section is devoted to the
presentation of the theory of Re#exive Modernization.
This theory attempts to address the issue of democracy in
a context in which the limits of the State and the crisis of
representation are acknowledged. Even Re#exive Mod-
ernization, however, maintains the unity of community
and government. This situation, it is argued in the con-
cluding portion of the paper, motivates a call for further
theorization of the limits of liberal democracy and scru-
tiny of the assumptions underlying programs aimed at
the improvement of conditions of the rural society.
2. Classical liberalism and the assumption of unity of
community and state
Liberalism argues for the centrality of a complex set of
individual rights (e.g., property, conscience, religion,
movement, press, speech, su!rage), which emerged in
opposition to premodern absolutism and dependency
and later were embodied in modern citizenship. Liberal
theorists asserted the new rights against patriarchal,
authoritarian, corporatist institutions, which stressed re-
ciprocal obligations between unequal estates (i.e., mostly
duties of subordinate to privileged strata). Their ideas
originated in medieval towns from the rupture with
seigniorial authority and the birth of the bourgeois class,
market relations, private property, and `freea labor. As
indicated by John Dewey in his 1935 essay Liberalism and
Social Action, early forms of Liberalism established the
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existence of `naturala rights (Locke, 1988 [1689]) which
were aimed at protecting individuals from the exercise of
aristocratic arbitrary rule. Economically, this situation
indicated that the emergent bourgeoisie was able to cre-
ate discourses in which taxation and other economic
practices could not be carried out without people's sup-
port. Politically, it symbolized that the new society re-
quired a corresponding unity between the actions of
rulers and the will of the people. The government must
follow the will of the community of citizens which freely
elected it. Simultaneously, citizens should obey legitimate
decisions made by their representatives elected to politi-
cal o$ces (Locke, 1988). This is the essence of Liberal-
ism's assumption of unity.
Subsequent forms of Classical Liberalism departed
from the notion of natural rights to stress the conse-
quences of socio-economic actions. In Dewey's formula-
tion this is the distinction between the old Lockean
philosophy and the subsequent utilitarian proposal of
Bentham (1996) [1789]). The utilitarian philosophy of
Bentham indicated that human actions were not based
on the existence of natural laws and rights. Instead, he
pointed out that humans followed behaviors whose con-
sequences they deemed bene"cial and legitimate. Accord-
ing to Dewey, Bentham's philosophy re#ected the
evolution of market relations and the movement against
the existence of signi"cant legal limits to the free circula-
tion of labor and capital (Dewey, 1963, pp. 16}20). The
emphasis on the introduction of laissez-faire policies,
which was theorized by Bentham and by Adam Smith in
his 1776 The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1976), represented
successful strikes against anti-capitalist restrictions
which widely existed in 18th century Europe.
These events marked a split between American and
Continental versions of Liberalism. Bentham and Smith
renderings of Liberalism appeared much less relevant in
the United States than the earlier Lockean formulation.
In the US, the non-existence of pre-capitalist forms of
production, the agriculturally based economy and the
pioneer conditions provided grounds for the domination
of local interests over national interests. For Bentham
and Smith laissez-faire did not preclude State interven-
tion if the latter generated an augmentation of the gen-
eral well-being. The utilitarian principle of the greatest
good to the greatest number allowed for the introduction
of redistributitive and socially oriented State intervention
at the national level. In the US, the bene"ts of self-help
and unrestricted private action were such self-evident
realities that made Bentham and Smith remarks about
State intervention much less appealing than Locke's call
for unchecked individualism. Similarly, in Europe Con-
servative Romanticism and Socialism* albeit from op-
posite view points* attacked the negative consequences
of industrialization. Romantic Pietism and Socialist
Egalitarianism lamented the deprived conditions of
lower segments of society and in so doing made a funda-
mental impact on the retheorization of Continental Lib-
eralism toward its collectivistic, pro-social measure ori-
entation which emerged in the 19th century. In the
United States, social conditions which allowed for
the retheorization of Liberalism appeared much later3
(Dewey, 1963, p. 21).
2.1. Classical Liberalism: John Stuart Mill's contribution
The utilitarian and the collective dimensions of Lib-
eralism were integrated in 19th century Continental for-
mulations. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is arguably the
most eloquent rendering of the liberal philosophical posi-
tion (Collini, 1989, p. vii; Danley, 1994, pp. 30}31; Gray
and Smith, 1991, p. 1). In this short essay published in
1859, Mill illustrated the most important tenets of Lib-
eralism, its historical origins and its ethical desirability
over competing ideological propositions. The following
account of the classical liberal position rests primarily on
Mill's seminal work.
For Mill one of the most important aspects of human
civilization was the struggle between liberty and author-
ity. In ancient societies, such as feudal England, it refer-
red to the con#ict between serfs and the seigniorial class
who ruled them. The latter obtained power from inherit-
ance or conquest and ruled regardless of the will of the
former (Mill, 1989, p. 5). Despite abuses, Mill argued,
people viewed the presence of absolute rulers as a neces-
sary protection from the community's external and inter-
nal enemies.
The collapse of feudalism and the birth of capitalism
paved the way for a fundamental reorganization of the
relationship between rulers and communities. The suc-
cessful struggle for liberty meant that absolute powers of
rulers were replaced by constitutional powers which rec-
ognized unalienable political and human rights and the
community's ability to appoint its political leaders (Mill,
1989, p. 6). In Mill's view the notion of community
represented the combination of individuality with ex-
ternal social relations. Departing from the Lockean idea
that uncontaminated individuality constituted the es-
sence of liberty, Mill acknowledged that social relations
played a fundamental part in the creation and mainten-
ance of communities. He certainly remained distant from
contemporary idealist interpretations (such as those the-
orized by Right Wing Hegelians) which equated the real-
ization of individual freedom with its dissolution into the
community. However, he contended that the attainment
of self-interest should be based on the broader notion of
the common good which constituted the moral grounds
on which liberty was to be established (Dewey, 1963, pp.
24}25). For him, community meant a network of social
3See the following discussion on Revisionist Liberalism and its
American application in the New Deal.
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relations based on the actions of individuals freed from
arbitrary restrictions. Because Mill understood commun-
ity in terms of individuality and social relations, his
notion transcends current popular readings of the term
which equate communities with geographical `localitiesa.
Instead, he employed it to indicate an entity which was
socially constructed and socially reproduced.4
Mill stressed the assumption of unity as he maintained
that the State should be a direct expression of the people
and that governing should be carried out in accordance
with the will of the community. Change in the rule of
government should be authorized either directly by the
people or by a political body which represents them. For
Mill, the essence of liberty was the elimination of the
ancient regime distinction between rulers and commun-
ity (Mill, 1989, pp. 7}8).
2.2. Representation
To be sure, Mill viewed the identi"cation of the State
with the community in much more problematic terms
than originally argued in continental debates. He con-
tended that the idea of a government which represented
the entire citizenship was inaccurate. The State represent-
ed the will of only a portion of the citizens who, through
active and successful intervention, established their views
as those of society. Society is a!ected by the power of
dominant classes and by their ability to condition behav-
iors and ideas. He wrote: `Where there is an ascendant
class, a large portion of the morality of the country
emanates from its class interests, and its feeling of class
superioritya (1989, p. 10). Because of the imperfection of
the representative system, he called attention to the
danger of `the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and
feelinga, and urged communities to allow the presence of
mechanisms and sensitivities which would prevent the
majority from oppressing minorities.
Mill considered de Toqueville's concept of the tyranny
of the majority as one of the more dangerous types of
political oppression. In particular, he argued against gov-
ernmental interventions which would establish rules of
conduct limiting the articulation and practice of dissent.
For example, Mill forcefully denounced communities
which equated the rules of conduct of the dominant
religion to those of society. He viewed this action as
a fundamental infringement upon minorities' freedom of
religion (Mill, 1989, pp. 16}17; 62}64). In his opinion,
4For Mill the concept of community can be equated with those of the
nation and the national society. His point was that when there exists
a community of individuals linked through social relations, these indi-
viduals should be free to express their wills through the use of political
means. The government is the collective expression of these wills and,
therefore, should represent the people from whom it is originated.
freedom of religion indicated that every individual
should practice the religion of his/her choice without
interferences from political authorities. Believers should
be able to act according to their faith as long as they did
not impose their views and behaviors on others. In his
account, Puritan communities in the United States
(1989), pp. 16}17) and Catholic countries such as Spain
(1989), pp. 30}31) represented cases of oppression based
on religious monism.5
Mill's extensive critique of the perils associated with
the liberal system of representation (that is a government
which is a direct expression of the will of its citizens)
indicated that his brand of Liberalism was centered on
the substantive unity of community and government. His
point was that democratic principles, such as `self gov-
ernmenta and `the power of the people over themselvesa,
could no longer be considered self-evident as they were in
early stages of the evolution of capitalism (1989, p. 7). The
growth of market forces and the social inequalities asso-
ciated with it made di!erential access to political power
quite evident. These conditions mandated a distinction
between formal and substantive liberal democracy. The
establishment of the latter required corrective measures
which he identi"ed in limited State intervention and in
a decision-making process based on continuous debates.
2.3. Limited state intervention
As far as limited State intervention is concerned, Mill
stood clearly in support of laissez-faire. For Mill social
and economic laissez-faire indicated that `2leaving
people to themselves is always better, ceteris paribus,
than controlling thema (1989, p. 96). He argued this point
by di!erentiating between ancient and contemporary so-
cieties. In ancient societies, conditions were so primitive
that wars and civil violence were widespread. Because of
these conditions, State intervention was desirable and
often required (1989, pp. 14}16). In modern societies,
the spread of political rights and participation as well as
the separation of spiritual and temporal authority
5His critique of the tyranny of the majority included other instances
as exempli"ed by his comments on Comte's positive philosophy (Mill,
1989, pp. 24}25). Mill described Comte's claim about the desirability of
a social system based on positive knowledge as `despotica (1989; p. 17).
Furthermore, he denounced the positivist claim about the existence of
ultimate truths as oppressive. Comte and like-minded thinkers con-
tended that applications of the scienti"c method allow humankind to
"nd ultimate `truthsa. These truths would forever disqualify alternative
interpretations as the former would permanently disprove the validity
of the later. Although Mill was a strong supporter of rigorous scienti"c
inquiry, he was equally committed to the idea that scienti"c inquiry
should be grounded on continuous and open debates (1989; p. 22). He
stressed that humans are fallible, therefore, assuming that any "nal
truth can be achieved endorsed humans' infallibility, which is a position
inconsistent with human nature (1989; p. 23).
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made strong State intervention unnecessary and even
counterproductive. The State, therefore, should limit
itself to the performance of two roles. The "rst was to
prevent abuses of individual liberties. The second role
consisted in the enforcement of democratically estab-
lished rules of conduct. More speci"cally, in Mill's opin-
ion, liberal democracy signi"ed that individuals were free
to act as long as it would not create harm to other human
beings (a condition known as the harm principle). State
intervention, therefore, should have been limited to the
defense of the harm principle. Additionally, he was for-
ever warning of the ine$ciency and ine!ectiveness of
State bureaucracy which prevented him from endorsing
any project which relied on signi"cant State intervention.
To be sure, Mill stood in disagreement with positions
which interpreted the harm principle in terms of radical
non-interference of the State. He recommended a much
more extensive State intervention than was commonly
acknowledged in 19th century England (Collini, 1989, pp.
xvi, xxxiii}xxxiv). For instance, he was in favor of a State
regulation of professions. It was inadmissible, for him,
that the State would allow anyone to practice a profes-
sion without a license. He was also sympathetic to the
plight of the working class and recognized the import-
ance of intervening to improve the scant living conditions
of lower classes. However, and contrary to socialist ac-
counts, he attributed workers' conditions to the malfun-
ctioning of social institutions and lack of capitalist
development. Accordingly, his sympathetic reading of
socialist proposals was countered by his conviction that
socialist theorists lacked adequate knowledge of the fun-
ctioning of capitalism and of the bene"ts that market
competition provided to society.
In essence, Mill's interpretation of the harm principle
was a #exible one. He recognized that the State should
not limit individual rights nor should it interfere with the
right of individuals to pursue `new and original experi-
ments in livinga. Simultaneously, he allowed State inter-
vention in some spheres which past experience revealed
as requiring corrections (1989, p. 81). In this case, the
community of citizens would empower the State to pre-
vent `generation after generation from falling over the
same principle which has been fatal to their prede-
cessorsa (1989, p. 81).
2.4. The role of debates in society
Mill's point was that substantive democracy cannot be
guaranteed by State intervention alone. It was in the
sphere of individuals' free action that ways of maintain-
ing and enhancing democracy were to be sought. In
Mill's liberalism, however, human initiatives entailed
control which he envisioned to be carried out through
open and free societal debates.
Mill contended that human actions should be centered
on moral grounds. Ethics, in his view, occupied center
stage in the establishment and maintenance of liberal
democracy. In this construct, ethics took primacy over
economical and political institutions. More speci"cally,
for Mill, (but also for other classical liberal such as
Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith (Danley, 1994, p. 148;
Pack, 1992)) the free functioning of the market and so-
ciety was subordinate to the objective of human happi-
ness. Because of the complex and varying nature of life,
ultimate decisions could not be left to inanimate mecha-
nisms such as the market, but they needed to be
grounded on human experience and re#ection. Mill ar-
gued: `human beings owe to each other help to distin-
guish the better from the worse, and encouragement to
choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be
forever stimulating each other to increase exercise of their
higher faculties, and increase direction of their feelings
and aims toward wise instead of foolish, elevating instead
of degrading, objects and contemplationsa (1989, p. 76).
The ethical posture, for Mill, required that human
beings be engaged in open and honest criticism. In his
view, it was the duty of any mature human being to point
out the limits of others' behaviors even if this conduct
called for a disregard of established rules of politeness.
He wrote `It would be well, indeed, if this good o$ce
were much more freely rendered than the common no-
tions of politeness at present permits, and if one person
could honestly point out to another that he thinks him at
fault, without being considered unmannerly or presum-
inga (1989, p. 77).
3. Socio-economic changes and the critique of classical
liberalism: revisionist liberalism and neo-liberalism
Revisionist Liberalism and Neo-liberalism stand as the
most salient revisions of Classic Liberalism. According to
Revisionist Liberal theory, the concentration of eco-
nomic power typical of advanced capitalism makes the
Classical Liberal assumption of a free market society
obsolete. It follows that the regulation of the economy
and the satisfaction of social needs should be addressed
through State intervention (Galbraith, 1952). Neo-liberal
theories, conversely, point to the ine!ective and ine$c-
ient performance of the State and call for a system based
on market oriented mechanisms. In their accounts, eco-
nomic and social matters should be addressed through
individuals voluntary association in the context of an
unrestricted free market society (Friedman, 1982).
Revisionist Liberalism and Neo-liberalism developed
in di!erent historical periods. Revisionist Liberal theor-
izations appeared in Europe in the second portion of the
19th century, gained visibility in the "rst portion of this
century and reached their highest level of popularity in
the post-World War Two era of `High-Fordist Capital-
isma (Antonio and Bonanno, 1996). Neo-liberal theories
have occupied center stage in social and economic
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debates since the 1970s and they have been proposed as
solutions for the crisis of Fordism arrangements.
Thatcherism and Reaganism popularized them in the
1980s and since then they have been informing the eco-
nomic policies of a number of countries around the globe.
3.1. Revisionist Liberalism
The di!usion of Liberalism in the 19th century was
followed by the rapid development of revisionist posi-
tions in the 20th century (Dewey, 1963). At the historical
level, the growth of large corporations and concentration
of economic power made the classical liberal idea of
self-regulating markets6 increasingly inadequate to rep-
resent mature capitalism. In the classical liberal tradition,
the e$cient functioning of the market assumed the ex-
clusive presence of small operators. Their limited size did
not allow them to a!ect market outcomes which were
determined by the aggregate working of all of the eco-
nomic activities. The development of oligopolies and
monopolies made these assumptions untenable. Through
concentration of resources, corporations were able to
increase control over market outcomes and enhance their
competitive positions. Size created barriers to market
accessibility and made assumptions about intrasectorial
mobility of capital and equal market information highly
questionable (Gordon, 1996; Reich, 1991).
The expansion of capitalism fostered social polariza-
tion and economic instability as well (Mishel and Be-
rnstein, 1993; Strobel, 1993). Despite periods of sustained
economic growth, the "rst third of the 20th century was
characterized by a series of economic crisis which cul-
minated with the 1930s' Great Depression. Economic
downturns highlighted market instability and the eco-
nomic vulnerability of members of the middle and work-
ing classes as gains obtained during periods of expansion
were quickly erased during crises (Dubofsky, 1994). Dis-
trust for the self-regulating capacity of the market was
widespread and calls for the alteration of laissez-faire
economic policies came from various sides of the social
spectrum. Unions' demands for economic stability were
echoed by industrialists' concerns over social unrest and
limited consumer markets (Polenberg, 1980). Overall
economic and political instabilities constituted fertile
grounds for a revision of Classic Liberalism.
At the theoretical level, attacks on Classic Liberalism
came from various sources. Economic theory was charac-
terized by the emergence of Keynesianism. According to
6The Classical Liberalism's concept of self-regulating markets refers
to the assumption that, if left untouched by external intervention such
as that of the State, market mechanisms tend to establish the best
possible combination of supply and demand of goods, services, and
labor. This way of reaching market equilibrium represents the core of
the `laissez-fairea economic theory.
Keynes (1935), market failure was a constant condition of
capitalism. More importantly, market generated prices
did not re#ect hidden costs (externalities) which were
unfairly charged to the community at large. These condi-
tions fostered widespread economic instability and reces-
sions. According to Keynesian economics, growth and
stability could be reached only through government
spending and overall State intervention.
At the level of social philosophy, classical liberal lais-
sez-faire postures were criticized from pragmatist, ideal-
ist, and materialist positions. Pragmatists, such as John
Dewey, viewed Liberalism as a doctrine which, over the
centuries, called for the elimination of oppressive forces.
Classical liberal formulations established prior to the
18th century were expressions of actions against, slavery,
serfdom and despotic aristocratic rule. Nineteenth cen-
tury Liberalism represented a call for the elimination of
legal procedures which hampered the #ourishing of capi-
talist forces of production. In the early portion of the
20th century, Liberalism for Dewey signi"ed `liberation
from material insecurity and from the coercion and re-
pression that prevents multitudes from participating in
the vast cultural resources that are at handa (Dewey,
1963, p. 48). Because, classical liberals failed to view the
connection between their theories and historical events,
Dewey maintained, laissez-faire strategies have been elev-
ated to the status of desired rules of conduct in situations
where the historical conditions were overwhelmingly dif-
ferent. In Dewey's view, the ahistorical dimension of
laissez-faire strategies disqualify them from representing
viable solutions to the issue of emancipation (Dewey,
1963, p. 49). From a pragmatist point of view, govern-
ment intervention aimed at the enhancement of the com-
mon good was desirable when it represented the most
e!ective manner to resolve current problems. Indeed,
even for classical liberals, such as Smith, Locke and John
Stuart Mill, government intervention in economic matter
was not totally inconceivable (Danley, 1994, p. 148). In
a situation characterized by social and economic instabil-
ity, pragmatist postures o!ered justi"cations for aban-
doning laissez-faire policies in favor of those calling for
State intervention (Galbraith, 1952).
The Hegelian idealist tradition provided another im-
portant source of critique against Classical Liberalism at
the outset of the 20th century. In a now classic volume,
Hobhouse ([1911] 1979) attacked the classical liberal
assumption that freedom was established through the
elimination of external constraints. Following Hegel, but
also Kant, Hobhouse pointed out that elimination of
external constraints does not lead to substantive freedom
for all people. He shared with classical liberals the idea
that Liberalism should be a means to achieve human
development. However, he contended that people who
did not have su$cient economic, cultural and social
resources were not free to develop. The State must inter-
vene to eliminate inequalities and to provide individuals
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with opportunities to actively participate in social
and economic life. If human development was the most
important objective in liberal democratic societies,
State intervention was necessary to remove the obstacles
to the e!ective participation of people in the life of
society.
Theories developed with the materialist tradition pro-
vided an even stronger critique of Classical Liberalism
(e.g., Hilferding, 1981; Luxemburg, 1972). Following
Marx's accounts of the exploitation of the working class
and crises in capitalism, materialists pointed out the false
equality of market relations. The working class, they
argued, was forced to enter market relations as it was
expropriated of its reproductive means. Their assumed
voluntaristic participation in the market, therefore, mas-
ked social inequality and class exploitation.
The economic crises of the "rst portion of the 20th
century and the availability of discourses objecting to
Classical Liberalism constituted grounds for the develop-
ment of Revisionist Liberalism. New Deal politics argu-
ably represented the most systematic implementation of
these ideals and one of the most signi"cant attempts to
establish a State regulated and managed market (Par-
sons, 1971; Rostow, 1960).
The Classical Liberalism assumption of unity seemed to
come to full fruition in post-World War II capitalism.
Revisionist Liberal policies seemed to work to reduce
the uncertainties of capitalism's unwanted consequences
as State managed resource allocation was considered
to outperform the free market and address social
needs. In the opinion of many, the problems of
Classic Liberalism were resolved without abandoning
democratic liberal ideas. The specters of unbridled capi-
talism and command societies appeared to be forever
eliminated.
Although greatly exaggerating this period's inclusion-
ary features, the rosy American vision of `postindustrial
societya (e.g., `classlessa, `pluralista, and `meritocratica)
expressed a perceived broadening of equality of oppor-
tunity and actual ideological and institutional changes
that made signi"cant new substantive rights an impor-
tant part of the reproduction and legitimation of capital-
ist production. Progress seemed substantial given the
fresh memories of depression, fascism, war and continued
Stalinism. Moreover, despite new types of mass media
manipulation, elite planning, exploitation (e.g., of `guest
workersa and `illegal immigrantsa), depoliticization
(i.e., through mass consumption) and security mecha-
nisms, the period should be seen through its own emerg-
ent cultural critiques of technocracy, non-participation,
and consumerism as well as through postindustrial
theory. Even the new post-materialist opposition who
held that the working class was now integrated into the
system (e.g., Marcuse, 1964), implied that the belief in
capitalist legitimacy was strong among the `alienateda
masses.
3.2. From Fordism to Global Post-Fordism and the crisis
of Revisionist Liberalism
Revisionist Liberalism's strategies of the much larger,
interventionist State successfully sustained steady
growth, balancing mass production and mass consump-
tion. Most importantly, "rms generated very high levels
of productivity by re"ning widely instituted Taylorist
strategies. Managers substantially enhanced their tech-
nical control by further centralizing and rationalizing the
labor process. While this strategy sharpened the distinc-
tion between production workers and managerial, pro-
fessional, and technical employees, the labor force was
paci"ed by steadily increasing wages, job security, oppor-
tunity for advancement, and expanding welfare (Harvey,
1990; Lipietz, 1992).
This Fordist capitalism combined highly rationalized,
centralized, and vertically integrated "rms with nation-
wide unions and a substantially expanded State; it had
highly specialized and mechanized production, bureau-
cratized "rms, extensive planning, and top-to-bottom
bureaucratic control. `High Fordisma is the term which
de"nes post-World War Two capitalism, or the mature,
hyperrationalized type of Fordism (Antonio and Bon-
anno, 1996). It had an elaborately segmented labor force,
a very large and complexly organized body of profes-
sional managerial and technical employees, and extreme-
ly sophisticated means of information, communication,
transportation, and control. The High Fordist State em-
ployed advanced Keynesian policies of much broader
"scal controls, socio-economic plans regulation, and
health, education, and welfare.
High Fordism enhanced inclusion of marginalized
people, raised the social wage substantially, and, in the
social democracies, sharply increased labor participation.
Even in the United States, however, unions enrolled
historically high percentages of workers, and wage/bene-
"t packages increased sharply (Chandler, 1977; Aglietta,
1979; Gordon et al., 1982; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988;
Lipietz, 1987,1992). Overall, High Fordism coordinated
mass production and mass consumption, steady accumu-
lation, and enhanced legitimacy and produced histori-
cally unparalleled economic growth and abundance. The
tacit `capital-labor accorda left control over the produc-
tion to management, but labor's role in political dis-
courses, policymaking, planning, and legislation was
increased. The middle class grew substantially, and en-
joyed sharply increased standards of living. Under High
Fordism, civil, political, and social rights were expanded
and regulatory legislation was increased. Equal oppor-
tunity was advanced, though the lowest strata bene"tted
little and sharp inequalities between the primary and
secondary sectors, production workers and professional
employees, and races, ethnic groups, and genders were
primary facets of the pattern of rationalization and
bureaucratization.
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Fordism impacted rural areas and some of their
primary activities such as agriculture in a variety of
important ways. Indeed it is not a coincidence that in
the United States, one of the "rst and most important
acts of the New Deal was the Agricultural Adjustment
Act (AAA) which shaped the future of agriculture for
years to come. Fordism involved the intervention of
the State to regulate production, labor and their rela-
tionships with the territory and to stabilize unwanted
consequences of capitalism. Under Fordism, through an
elaborate and growing set of price support and other
commodity programs as well as measurers to enhance
the well-being of agricultural workers and rural resi-
dents, the State was able to regulate markets and
manage a steady #ow of rural-to-urban migration
along with an unprecedented explosion of production
and productivity. Fordist agriculture worked well not
only in the United State, but also in other world regions.
In the European Union, for instance, Fordist regulation
of commodity production and rural development
transformed a chronically de"citary and sub-developed
agricultural sector into one of the major actors in the
global food scene. It is also important to note that
Fordist market regulation was not simply a domestic
issue, it mandated regulation of world commodities
and market. In the United State, for example, agricul-
tural and food programs were actively employed as
tools of international policy. PL 480 (the act which
regulated food aid to developing nations) and the stra-
tegic use of agricultural and food commodities are cases
in point.
Though under Fordism the agricultural structure be-
came increasingly polarized and both the number of
workers and farms declined, inclusionary processes
emerged. Commodity programs helped stabilizing farm
income and provided needed security in volatile markets.
Large producers overwhelmingly bene"tted from State
intervention. However, medium and small farm oper-
ators received support which often made the di!erence
between remaining active in farming or leaving the sec-
tor. Relatively low interest rates and in#ation further
allowed for expansion of farm operations across the
sector. Simultaneously, consumers' demands for better
food quality translated into pertinent legislation, en-
hanced sensitivities about better nutrition, and expanded
consciousness about the need for a more adequate rela-
tionship between agricultural production and the envi-
ronment.
Fordism was functioning at nearly optimum levels
from the middle 1950s to the late 1960s. But, in the early
1970s, the regime was faltering badly and exposing seri-
ous contradictions (Harvey, 1990; Aglietta, 1979). In the
United States, the rise of the civil rights movement, urban
violence, growth of white fears and white #ight, and other
problems related to de facto segregation and the Black
underclass intensi"ed the contradictions surrounding
welfare and poverty. Also, student resistance to the war
in Vietnam and the intensifying protests and countercul-
tural activities also began to split the Reformist Liberal
majority.
Economic crisis accelerated High Fordism destabiliz-
ation. Increasingly competitive international markets (re-
sulting from the full recovery of Europe and Asia from
the ravages of World War Two), American capital's in-
su$cient investment in new technologies and organiza-
tional stagnation, the failure of the polity to develop an
industrial policy, in#ationary impact of the Vietnam war,
increased costs of social welfare, and other factors
began a new, downward phase of post-war capitalism.
The oil crisis, severe recession of 1973, the end of the
Bretton Woods concord, and stag#ation signi"ed a
possible decomposition of United States centered multi-
national capitalism. Harrison and Bluestone (1988)
refer to this period as the beginning of the `U-turna in
American capitalism; a shift to low-wage, part-time jobs
and disintegration of the post-war `capital}labor ac-
corda. In the late 1970s, Thatcherism and Reaganism
marked a decisive shift to low-in#ation/high-unemploy-
ment (and underemployment) policies (Strobel, 1993;
Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; Bowles and Gintis, 1982).
The basic features of Revisionist Liberalism inspired
Fordism began to be viewed as the source of crippling
rigidities.
Heightened global competition and the above-men-
tioned political and economic crises brought new strat-
egies aimed at reducing in#ation by slowing growth,
weakening the power of organized labor, tolerating
higher unemployment, and slashing the social wage
(e.g., Aglietta, 1979; Akard, 1992; Gordon et al., 1982;
Harrison and Bluestone, 1988; Lipietz, 1992; Strobel,
1993). Revisionist liberal policies that earlier had been
envisioned as chief motor forces of post-war growth
were now treated as causes of the economic contraction.
Critics held that the capital}labor accord produced
a crippling pro"t-squeeze that endangered capitalism
and that a substantial part of the High Fordist institu-
tional and ideological complex ought to be dismantled
(Akard, 1992; Lipietz, 1992; Harvey, 1990). Most impor-
tantly, many of the core Revisionist Liberal policies
which were employed to expand opportunity and
rights were made into prime targets of strategies
aimed at increasing the freedom of property holders
at the expense of wage workers and subaltern strata
and distributing wealth and power upward7 (Harvey,
1990).
The new conditions which have emerged from the
crisis of Fordism have been grouped under the concept of
7These strategies were inspired by the Neo-liberal theory which will
be illustrated in the next section.
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Global Post-Fordism8 (Antonio and Bonanno, 1996; Bon-
anno and Constance, 1996). Post-Fordism's most deci-
sive aspect has been increased `#exibilitya on a global
scale; mobile capital, free to colonize and commodify
practically every sphere has shattered the relatively "xed
social and temporal}spatial boundaries and generated
decentralized production. Production is now decom-
posed into sub-units and sub-production processes, car-
ried out by globally dispersed "rms with highly divergent
forms of labor, managerial, and "nancial organizations.
Public enterprises are privatized, and increasingly the
availability of vital services depends on the capacity to
pay and/or overall pro"tability. Global Post-Fordism is
di$cult to map, but is not aleatory or `disorganizeda
(Lash and Urry, 1987; O!e, 1985; Piore and Sabel, 1984).
The new `#exiblea structures serve "nancial rationaliza-
tion, concentrating resources, by-passing obstacles,
locating more e$cient forms of production, hedging
against possible economic shifts, and taking advantage of
new "nancial and tax instruments. Decentralized produc-
tion goes hand in hand with more highly centralized
control of "nance, research, and information. Global
Post-Fordist `economic developmenta and free trade
policies utilize the State itself to enhance capital mobility,
erode its own local, regional, and national regulatory
instruments, and reduce labor's bargaining power and
in#uence.
The turnabout from record post-war growth pro-
duces a pervasive sense that post-war structures of
accumulation have failed and that social policy needs
to be reversed quickly. Global Post-Fordist e!orts to
reignite growth weaken or eliminate post-war mecha-
nisms aimed at increasing equal opportunity, providing
for the unemployed and needy, and blocking the
colonization of valued non-economic environments by
capital. Rather than equal rights, emphasis is increas-
ingly on the costs of regulation and need to increase
discipline and security. Several key points should be
highlighted.
(1) The free mobility and global extension of Post-
Fordist capital render permeable virtually all
spatial}temporal, political, and social `bordersa that
once constrained capital, creating new vulnerabilities for
the well-being and identities of individuals and national,
regional, and local communities.
8A portion of the literature on the changes which occurred in this
period has rejected the notion of the end of Fordism (e.g., Gordon,
1996,1988). Despite the importance of the debate between the scholars
who argued the end of Fordism and those who refute this conclusion, it
remains outside the objective of this article. In terms of the following
discussion, it is maintained that the socio-economic conditions con-
stituting Fordism have been signi"cantly altered. However, this does
not imply that all the aspects constituting Fordism have been alto-
gether eliminated.
(2) New patterns of socio-cultural di!erentiation and
socio-cultural homogenization are stimulated by Global
Post-Fordism's break with post-war structures of accu-
mulation and the new highly disjunctive pattern of
socio-cultural structures and processes (e.g., decentraliz-
ing and centralizing tendencies; new mechanisms of glo-
bal transport, information production, and media; highly
divergent and unequal forms of production and con-
sumption).
3) Post-Fordism generates a `crisis of culturea that
problematizes post-war `culturea, bankrupts `moderniz-
ationa theories and politics, stimulates diverse challenges
to specialized science, technology, and other cultural
practices, and generates new `cultural theoriesa about
the `enda of history and modernity, signi"ers without
referents, and fresh modes of `cultural politicsa.
(4) More importantly for this study, the spatial}tem-
poral unity of the polity and the economy that character-
ized the earlier phases of capitalist development has been
fractured. In previous phases of capitalism * from the
early competitive one to the most recent monopolistic
phase* the growth of economic relations was centered
on the existence of nation-states whose polities (the State)
coordinated and mediated activities of economic actors.
The historical role of the State was twofold. First, it
enhanced processes of accumulation of capital. And sec-
ond, it legitimized accumulation to those segments of
society which did not bene"t from it (e.g., O'Connor,
1986; O!e and Ronge, 1979; Poulantzas, 1978). However,
subordinate segments of society (such as the working
class) were able to use the State to advance their interests
and introduce legislative measures which bene"tted them
(e.g., pro-labor legislation, creation of social services,
enhanced education opportunities, etc.) (Block, 1980;
Carnoy, 1984 Miliband, 1969). Overall, though, the al-
liance between States and national bourgeoises charac-
terized the creation and growth of national economies
"rst, and the expansion of the interests of these bour-
geoises across the globe later (Braudel, 1982,1984). In
these phases of capitalist development, key elements were
the State ability to control economic activities which
took place within its jurisdiction,9 and the identi"cation
of corporations with countries of origin (Sassen, 1990). In
this context, international operations were treated as
extensions of entrepreneurial activities designed and en-
gineered in the home country and supported by its State
apparatus.
Under Global Post-Fordism, the ability of the nation-
state to control economic activities and to be identi"ed
9To be sure, processes of mediation and coordination of socio-
economic activities carried out by the State have always been contested
as various social groups acted to advance their interests. However,
because of its powers, the State was able to generate capital accumula-
tion and social legitimation.
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with corporations has been greatly diminished (Bonanno
and Constance, 1996; Harvey, 1990; Lash and Urry,
1994). As indicated above, in order to enhance economic
viability, corporations have transnationalized their op-
erations by spreading production processes across na-
tional borders (Antonio and Bonanno, 1996; Spybey,
1996; Reich, 1991). This move achieved the primary ob-
jective of bypassing State regulations and requirements.
Today, if unfavorable legislation and climates emerge in
one country, corporations can bypass them by moving
operations to other locations. This hyper-mobility of capi-
tal is one of the major characteristics of Global Post-
Fordism (Bonanno and Constance, 1996; Harvey, 1990).
By decentralizing and restructuring production pro-
cesses, transnational corporations also created a situ-
ation in which corporate products and overall identity
cannot be associated unambiguously with a particular
country (Reich, 1991). The automotive industry exemp-
li"es this change. Until a few decades ago, almost all
automobiles were built from domestic components and
assembled in plants located in the same country. Today,
components have diverse national origins and relatively
few might be made in the nation where "nal assemblage
takes place.10 Similar consideration can be made for the
agro-food sector. For example, while Cargill, the largest
agro-food corporation in the world, is headquartered in
Minnesota, it has a subsidiary called Tradax which oper-
ates from Geneva, Switzerland. Tradax also coordinates
Cargill's global agro-food enterprises which include op-
erations in about 50 countries around the world. Simul-
taneously, Sun Valley Thailand is a joint venture between
Cargill, Inc., and Nippon Meat Packers, the largest meat
company in Japan. Sun Valley Thailand sources modern
production facilities and the formal production contract
system from Cargill, Inc., rapidly expanding consumer
markets in Japan from Nippon Meat Packers, and high-
quality low-cost feed, low-paid, docile workforce, and
lenient government regulations from Thailand (e.g., Bon-
anno et al., 1994). In essence, the lack of national identity
increases #exibility by reducing loyalty and responsibility
to national entities and their economic, social, and politi-
cal requirements.11
The point is the State's capacity to mediate between
market and society has been weakened. The State is
increasingly unable to control the #ow of economic
resources according to the rules established through
10However, companies still utilize national identity as a marketing
strategy (e.g., Chrysler's #agwaving `America's backa advertisements).
The hypocrisy of the `buy Americana is epitomized by Wal-Mart's use
of `made in the USa lables on goods made outside the country.
11The ability of transnational corporations to by-pass nation-state
has been widely documented in the literature. See, for example, Bon-
anno and Constance, 1996; Friedland, 1994; Gouveia, 1994; He!ernan
and Constance, 1994; Sanderson, 1986; Skladany and Harris, 1995.
democratic processes. However, this does not mean that
the State has been generally weakened. It indicates that
Global Post-Fordism has substantially reduced the local,
regional, and nation-state's control over its economic
and non-economic environments (Antonio and Bon-
anno, 1996; Bonanno and Constance, 1996; Harvey,
1990; Ross and Trachte, 1990). Global Post-Fordist "rms
seek settings with good `business environmentsa. While
this can mean a skilled labor force and highly developed
and well-maintained infrastructures, it also very fre-
quently means low wages, docile and unorganized labor,
and lax regulation of the workplace and environment.
`Economic developmenta often means encouraging com-
petitive rollbacks in all these areas (Lambert, 1991, p. 9;
Mingione, 1991). Moreover, States use tax abatements
and various other subsidies to attract or simply hold
businesses. Consequently, socio-political controls that
contribute to the relative autonomy of community and
national institutions and that provide them limited safety
from unrestricted economic rationalization undergo seri-
ous erosion.
The fracture of the spatio-temporal unity between the
polity and the economy a!ects the assumption of unity.
Because the State is increasingly unable to control eco-
nomic and non-economic environments, the directions
that it receives from its community of citizens cannot be
fully implemented as assumed by Liberal theory. The
fracture of the spatio-temporal unity between polity and
the economy, therefore, signi"es a crisis of political rep-
resentation. The State is increasingly unable to represent
the will of its people. The tendency is a move away from
a situation in which community members maintain the
possibility of expressing their wills at the political level as
mandated by Liberalism. This situation is replaced by
one in which powerful economic actors disproportionally
increase their political power at the expenses of other
groups whose interests are at stake. It is an expansion of
the class dimension of society and a departure from the
realization of the notion of substantive participation
called for by Mill. More importantly, this is not due to
contingent inadequacies of the functioning of the State,
but it is the outcome of global processes which transcend
the sphere of action of the State. This crisis of democracy
limits the participatory capacity of citizens and their
actual possibilities to in#uence socio-economic out-
comes. As Ulrich Beck puts it: `We are already in the
initial stages of a global social culture and economy with
pseudo-independent regional governments. The demo-
cratic electoral structure, organized on the basis on a na-
tion-state, does not re#ect global dependanciesa (1995,
p. 45).
To be sure, in the liberal tradition political representa-
tion was understood as a contested terrain and it was not
taken for granted. As indicated by Mill, political repres-
entation needed to be actively pursued and defended
from various perils, including that of the tyranny of the
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majority. However, Mill and other liberals assumed
that political participation should be a substantial di-
mension of democracy and never supposed that there
could have been a dissolution to the basic ability of
citizens to participate. The danger to this liberal assump-
tion today is that access to the realm of substantive
participation is jeopardized by the vanishing unity be-
tween community and government stemming out of the
transformations generated by the emergence of Global
Post-Fordism.
3.3. Neo-liberalism
The emergence of Global Post-Fordism points to
the exhaustion of the type of post-war Revisionist
Liberalism that dominated culturally and politically
the post World War Two socio-economic expansion.
In this context, Neo-liberal theories claimed to be the
liberal responses to the new social, economic and
cultural conditions. Milton Friedman's work (e.g.,
Friedman, 1982,1977; Friedman and Friedman, 1980)
arguably constitutes the most relevant representation of
these formulations. His best known book, Capitalism
and Freedom, was originally published in 1962. But, as
Friedman indicates in the preface of the 1982 edition,
his work went mostly unnoticed until the 1970s when
the crises of Fordism and of Revisionist Liberalism
created a favorable intellectual climate for the
di!usion of his ideas. Friedman's Neo-liberalism
stands in sharp opposition to the Classical Liberal
view of the relationship between ethics and the market.
In the Classical Liberal tradition, ethics governs
the conditions within which market relations develop
and the quest for human happiness takes primacy
over economic freedom. Markets presume the existence
of `societya and without its cultural bases the function-
ing of economic institutions is highly problematic.
Conversely, for Friedman, market relations take
primacy over other spheres of human activity (1982, p.
8). In this context, political freedom is subordinate to
economic freedom as it is `an end in itselfa and the most
basic condition for the development of a free, demo-
cratic society (1982, pp. 8}9; 1977, pp. 10}11). `The kind
of economic organization that provides economic free-
dom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also pro-
motes political freedoma (1982, p. 9) Friedman
contends.
According to Friedman, the primacy of economic free-
dom translates into the superiority of laissez-faire ar-
rangements over solutions which contemplate State
intervention. This position refutes Revisionist Liberalism
call for a regulating and intervening State, but also de-
parts from Classical Liberalism's notion that the State
can intervene in spheres which have been appropriately
identi"ed by the community. For Adam Smith, John
Stuart Mill and other classical liberals, the primacy of
ethics over the market signi"ed that the pursuit of happi-
ness could include strategies which involved State
intervention. These strategies, however, should have
represented the best possible solutions to the problems
at hand. Classical liberals viewed the market pragmati-
cally and it was considered only a means to achieve
the betterment of human and social conditions. In
Friedman's view the free market is always superior to
other arrangements and, therefore, it is always
superior to State regulation of the economy and society.
More importantly, State intervention is considered the
primary source of crises in capitalism (Friedman, 1982,
pp. 38}39). For Friedman, for example, the American
Great Depression was generated by the US government
mismanagement of monetary policies (1982, p. 38).
He and other like-minded theorists rede"ne public
policy interventions to cope with inequality as the real
social problem, singing praises about the virtues of
self-help, eliminating social programs, and shrinking
ine$ciencies by reliance on market mechanisms. For
example, Mill's contention that the State should
regulate professions through licensing is refuted by
Friedman who argues that: `a citizen of the United States
who under the laws of various states is not free to follow
the occupation of his own choosing unless he can get
a license for it, is deprived of an essential part of his
freedoma (1982, p. 9).
In populist sounding pronouncements about competi-
tive individualism, Friedman treats poverty and mar-
ginalization as unalterable natural conditions, arising
from aggregated inherited di!erences in individual
cognitive skills and/or inevitable variance in individual
character and morality. Moreover, he holds that elimina-
tion of special protections and programs for racial
and ethnic minorities, gays, and women makes for a
more just society (Friedman, 1982, pp. 108}118). Most
importantly and strongly departing from Classical
Liberalism's call for compassion and care for the disen-
franchised, Friedman and other Neo-liberals write o!
e!orts to reduce class disparities and the growing num-
bers of people who lack resources for the nurturance of
selves capable of competing for middle class roles in the
private economy and exercising their citizenship rights.
They argue that the increased #exibility and tax savings
from the dismantling of these aspects of High Fordism
will stop the erosion of the `middle classa. They call
for a `Two-thirds societya, which revives opportunity
for the middle classes and increases control over mar-
ginalized people.
Neo-liberal individualism embraces liberties without
a sense of the importance of equality for maintaining the
overall interdependence on which the specialized division
of labor depends. This Global Post-Fordist ideology is
more individualistic than classical economic and social
theories, which stressed the idea of a division of labor
and, at least, an idea of economic cooperation and inter-
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dependence.12 By contrast, Neo-liberalism transforms
the "rm into a projection of the supposedly entrepreneur-
ial ego of the CEO, and employees, when they are con-
sidered at all, are viewed as individual psyches to be
approached in terms of human relations strategies. Con-
sistent with the Global Post-Fordist vision of repressive
rigidities, Neo-liberals see wider languages stressing the
value of social interdependency and public institutions as
coercive and even totalitarian concepts. One's location
with regard to occupation and wealth is viewed as an
outcome of individual attributes, skills, and motivation
(i.e., biological inheritance, individual psychology, and
`lucka). Additionally, class is, by nature, a more abstract
and less visible `sociala phenomenon, easily con#ated
with race, ethnicity, or characteristics of concrete groups.
The individualistic purview of Neo-liberal theories denies
the reality of class. They seek claims that class is a collec-
tive phenomenon that provides potential for group
formation as a "ction and re#ection of the resentment of
unsuccessful individuals and those progressive liberal or
left forces that seek to manipulate it for their political
interest. Consequently, Neo-liberalism equates justice
with liberty, explaining away the contradiction between
formal and substantive freedom. In this framework, so-
cial equality is seen as a leveling ideology inherently
opposed to genuine individuality and contradictory to
liberty and democracy.
Today, especially in the United States, Neo-liberals
hold that public institutions, particularly those devoted
to health, education, and welfare and to regulation of
capital, are wasteful drags on the economy. In the case of
agriculture and other rural-related issues, commodity
programs, quality of food legislation, farm income sup-
port programs, program for the protection of the envi-
ronment and agro-food trade controls are considered
primary sources of the sector's problems. Indeed, it is
maintained that issues such as agricultural overproduc-
tion, low farm income levels, farm bankruptcies would
have not existed if market institutions were allowed to
function without external interferences. At the interna-
tional level, the case of Chile is often cited to illustrate the
e!ectiveness of Neo-liberal policies in agriculture. Ad-
vised by Friedman, Chilean authorities eliminated state
intervention and opened up labor and agricultural
commodity markets to foreign competition. More
12The works of Adam Smith (1976) Mill (1989) but also those of
Marx (1977) Weber (1949) and Durkheim (1984), albeit in signi"cantly
di!erent ways, point out the importance of maintaining cooperation
and solidarity in society. These classical social theorists recognized that
completely unrestricted markets would destroy their own socio-cultural
foundations. Even those among them who advocate laissez-faire, from
Adam Smith to Jeremy Bentham, contended that market societies
depend on `interdependencea and altruism, which insure that the
atomistic and individualistic aspects of capitalism have positive social
outcomes.
importantly, they eliminated pro-labor legislation
and other measures to enhance the local business
climate. The result was that, despite stagnant wage levels,
agricultural production, employment and pro"ts grew
considerably (Gomez and Goldfrank, 1991).
Neo-liberals emphasize the need to diminish the
sphere of public goods and politics, subordinating them
to the private economy. The growing hegemony of the
market and erosion of its social mediation again raises
issues brought up in Durkheim's critique of Spencer, i.e.,
the argument that the market itself arises from and de-
pends upon social institutions and solidarities and that
the market or that the market alone cannot provide the
social and normative bonds necessary to maintain a so-
ciety (Durkheim, 1984, pp. 149}65). In modern societies,
as Durkheim argued, these bonds require a sense of social
justice or fairness to maintain a primarily `voluntarya or
at least not directly coercive (i.e., formally free) system of
socio-economic relations. Without justice, we must heed
Durkheim's warning about a `sociological monstrositya
* unmediated atomistic individualism and a surplus of
external inequality call forth the total State to "ll the
breech left by the absence of voluntary social interdepen-
dence (Durkheim, 1984, liv).
Despite its signi"cant di!erences from Classical and
Revisionist forms of Liberalism, Neo-liberalism main-
tains the assumption of unity. Friedman's critique of State
interventionism is based on the contention that more
than minimal State action hampers the will of the com-
munity as it prevents some of its members to pursue
wanted objectives through desired strategies. In this re-
spect, for Friedman a State which represents the com-
munity is a State which protects it from external enemies
and guarantees the conditions for internal harmony and
peace. Simultaneously, community members must obey
the collectively established laws which the State is called
upon to uphold (1982, pp. 34}35). The correspondence
between State and the community of citizens is, in Fried-
man's view, to be criticized only in contingent terms. But,
it remains an assumed theoretical condition of his Neo-
liberal formulation. Friedman's objection is that Revi-
sionist Liberal policies and other forms of collectivism
have undermined the unity of community and State by
allowing the latter to oppress the former. A return to
unrestricted laisser-faire would reestablish the appropri-
ate balance of power so that communities can prosper
and the State can assume a much more e$cient and
much less wasteful posture.
4. The proposal of Re6exive Modernization
The crises of Revisionist Liberal theories and Fordist
arrangements have not exclusively been grounds for con-
servative responses. In the progressive camp, a number of
theories have proposed analyses of and solutions to the
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problems of contemporary Global Post-Fordism. Reyex-
ive Modernization is perhaps the most eloquent of these
theories and certainly a formulation which has received
considerable attention in academic and intellectual
circles.13 Though it is not a uni"ed theoretical construct,
it refers to the works of theorists who reject the idea of
the end of modernity and insist on the availability of
newly generated opportunities for critically informed ac-
tion. This reyexivity emerges out of the crisis of Fordist
arrangements and becomes the most signi"cant eman-
cipatory tool in Global Post-Fordism. Though Re#exive
Modernization theorists often discuss the work of Marx
and share some of the tenets of the Marxian critique of
capitalism, they stand outside the Marxian tradition to
embrace a vision of democracy and society which is much
more consistent with the Liberal philosophical tradi-
tion.14 Their acceptance of capitalist arrangements and
their distancing from a class-based discourse locate them
away from the Marxian left and into the liberal radical
tradition. Key examples of Re#exive Modernization are
the works of Beck (1995,1992) Giddens (1994,1991,1990)
and Lash and Urry (1994) (see also works by Beck,
Giddens, Lash and Urry in 1994) which will be brie#y
discussed below.
The common starting point of these authors is that
contemporary society is experiencing a crisis of modern-
ity. Rather than embracing the often discussed concept of
post-modernity, they argue that we are in a period of high
modernity. Modernity in their views is characterized by
the process of individualization. Individualization man-
dates a social organization which breaks sharply with
that of pre-capitalist societies based on collective and
seignorial dominated social relations. In previous phases
of modernity, however, the process of individualization
was hampered by the existence of powerful institutions
such as the welfare state, the family, trade unions, politi-
cal parties and above all institutions producing formal
science. These institutions limited the ability of indi-
viduals to make decisions about their lives and to devel-
op individualized selves. Accordingly, decisions
concerning areas such as work, family, politics, sexual
preferences, and ideological postures were largely left to
institutional realms. Giddens refers to this period as
13 It could be argued that a number of other theories could better
address current social concerns. In e!ect, my selection of Re#exive
Modernization is not based on a claim of scienti"c superiority of this
theory over others. Rather, it is a selection based on the fact that
Re#exive Modernization is a theory based on liberal assumptions and
one which maintains the assumption of unity. For these reasons it can
be employed to illustrate innovative proposals from a liberal perspect-
ive and to point out the limits of this perspective in Global post-
Fordism.
14This is an evaluation which does not apply equally to the various
authors considered here. Lash and Urry (1994), for instance, ground
their Economies of Signs and Space on Marx's theory of circulation.
simple modernization (1994, p. 42). Simple modernization
reached its highest point during Fordism. During this
period, society produced enough goods that its primary
feature was its ability to distribute them * albeit un-
equally * to all the segments of society. Beck (1992), p.
13) argues that today we do not have a society which
distributes goods, but rather a society which distributes
risks. By risks Beck and the other authors signify the
development of global dangers such as environmental
degradation, nuclear disasters and economic and social
decay. These risks, they continue, are global in nature
(i.e., they concern everyone in the world) and cannot be
controlled by traditionally established institutions such
as the nation-state. In other words, the scope of current
risks transcends the spatial and temporal limits within
which available countervailing strategies can be applied.
Responding to the claims that the `end of historya
(Fukuyama, 1992) has forever dissolved threats to
democracy, it is argued that this situation creates the
conditions for a deeper crisis of democracy and freedom
which re-proposes the struggle for democracy more
forcefully than ever (Beck, 1995, p. 151).
The risk society is, then, characterized by a discrep-
ancy between risks and instruments to address them.
Currently, we have a society in which institutions can
only partially address these risks. More importantly, in
many cases, they have no instruments to seriously ad-
dress these problems. This crisis, however, contains ele-
ments for possible solutions. Today, these authors
contend, the process of individualization is accelerated.
The crisis of institutions leaves individuals with ex-
panded opportunities to make decisions about their lives.
Giddens calls these enhanced opportunities the condi-
tions for the expansion of life politics, a term which
indicates individuals enhanced ability to select life styles
once adjudicated by nature or tradition (Giddens, 1994).
The crisis of institutions gives individuals possibilities to
decide about issues which previously were de"ned within
institutional frameworks. Accordingly, individuals are
much freer to make decisions about political, cultural
and economic issues. In other words, cultural, technolo-
gical and structural changes enabled people to be more
directly responsible for their lives and to assertively act in
the web of everyday life. This possibility to act is de"ned
as re#exivity and the current historical period as Reyex-
ive Modernization.
Re#exive Modernization refers to the `possibility of
individuals to re#ect critically on these changes and their
social conditions of existence and hence potentially to
change thema. (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 32) Giddens,
Beck and Lash and Urry, are forever warning of the
repressive consequences that the end of simple modernity
and the globalization of economy and society have
brought about. Moreover, they are aware of criticisms
directed against premature generalizations of new social
movements accomplishments in advanced societies to the
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rest of the globe. In other words, they are aware of the
fact that repression against emancipatory processes is
strong and that the possibility of establishing them is
unevenly distributed around the world. Yet they see the
current period as one in which a positive reconstruction
of society is possible. Beck compares the current situ-
ation with that of the end of pre-modernity and argues:
`just as modernization dissolved the structure of feudal
society in the nineteenth century and produced the indus-
trial society, modernization today is dissolving industrial
society and another modernity in coming into beinga.
(1994, p. 10).
In their accounts, the dissolution of modern institu-
tions derives from their incapacity to address current
issues. The concept of globalization is employed to sum-
marize today's problems. The risk society is a global
society in which phenomena a!ect the entire globe and,
more importantly, cannot be addressed exclusively at the
local level. Though local action is paramount, it is the
global nature of these issues which quali"es the di!erence
between this period and previous historical periods. In
various ways, these authors stress the importance of the
relationship between local and global and the manner in
which it quali"es the crisis of institutions.
As indicated above, the transformation of the State is
based on global processes. These authors contend that
the #ows of commodities, capital and information cannot
be controlled at the national level. These #ows are too
complex and di!erentiated to be monitored by pre-
viously established institutions and their strategies. In
particular, Lash and Urry (1994), p. 292}295) speak of the
end of organized capitalism and the development of disor-
ganized capitalism. They equate organized capital with the
Fordist period. Under organized capitalism, social and
economic problems were understood to be solvable at the
national level. Accordingly, the State intervened in the
economy and in society to address `risksa generated by
the evolution of capitalism. Keynesian strategies were
paramount in this process. Under disorganized capitalism,
global actors and #ows make these strategies ine!ective.
Risks now transcend national boundaries.
The inability of the nation-state to address these prob-
lems is interpreted both in negative and emancipatory
terms. The end of organized capitalism and the failure of
the welfare state have created social and economic degra-
dation which the State cannot correct with traditional
forms of intervention. Unemployment, urban decay, un-
certainties are some of the negative characteristics of the
current situation. Additionally, these authors indicate
that in the last two decades economic growth (i.e., in-
creases in GNPs, increases in production and productiv-
ity) translated into decreased levels of employment and
sharp polarization between the wealthy and the lower
classes. As Lash and Urry (1994), p. 160) put it `the new
lower classes su!er2from increasing poverty. At the
same time the wealthy have got richer. In the USA,
Britain and elsewhere, middle income groups are becom-
ing scarcer as income distribution increasingly assume
a bimodal patterna. It is their thesis that the bottom
segments of society become increasingly excluded from
economic and social rewards which are funneled toward
the upper social strata. Arguing against those who inter-
preted these changes in terms of `end of the working
classa they maintain that the lower classes represent
a `sort of structural downward mobility for substantial
sections of the organized-capitalist working class, as well
as a set of structural social places into which large num-
ber of immigrants #owa. (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 145)
The end of organized capitalism creates also the condi-
tions for progressive outcomes. Above all, emancipatory
conditions are fostered by the existence of re#exive mod-
ernization. However, the crisis of the Keynesian welfare
state also generates emancipatory possibilities. Despite
its progressive nature, there has always been a repressive
dimension of the welfare state. Its expansion mandated
the existence of `rigiditiesa which prescribed constricted
behaviors and hampered the practice of alternative strat-
egies. Accordingly, its crisis frees individuals and commu-
nities to explore patterns of actions unavailable before.
This condition, these authors contend, forms the basis on
which `newa progressive movements and practices can
develop.
In this context, the evolution of the State is viewed as
potentially progressive. The crisis of the nation-state fa-
vors the reproduction of local `statesawhich can respond
more rapidly to the demands emerging from the com-
munity. Simultaneously, local `statesa can be more open
to direct participation, to the inclusion of diverse groups
and consequently they can foster substantive democracy.
The concept of subpolitics (Beck, 1992, p. 190}194) indi-
cates the move away from democratic actions through
traditional political channels. It is in the generation of
movements from below and in the displacement of politi-
cal action away for sclerotized political spheres that these
authors locate the existence of elements for the genera-
tion of concrete democracy.
The progressive and regressive character of the high
modern disorganized State is paralleled by a similar
vision of the economy. These authors in general, and
Lash and Urry in particular, argue that processes of
restructuring of corporations have not only increased
their power but have also created new forms of democra-
tization in the production process. Lash and Urry insist
on the notion of reyexive accumulation. This concept is
considered superior to previously employed concepts
such as those of #exible specialization and Post-Fordism.
In underscoring the characteristics of re#exive accumula-
tion, they point out that contemporary economies are
based on services and that knowledge and information
are central aspects of capital accumulation. Additionally,
contemporary economies should be analyzed not only in
terms of production but also consumption. Furthermore,
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specialized production and consumption require a
production of signs, indicating symbolic processes and
the aestheticization of production and consumption are
central in contemporary capitalism. In other words, com-
modities acquired value not only because they are pro-
duced for exchange but also because speci"c `aesthetica
meanings are attached to them. For example in the case
of the agro-food sector, the di!usion of organic foods is
based on the recognition of the existence of important
socially valued meanings attached to them. The aes-
theticization of production and consumption increases
the possibilities for individuals to select consumption
patterns in more meaningful manners than in the past. In
turn, this situation allows individuals to have broader
spaces for the construction of their identities. Further-
more, this situation allows consumers to establish free
spaces despite the actions of agro-food transnational cor-
porations. In essence, the conscious freedom to choose
becomes a political weapon against corporate control.
5. Liberalism, Re6exive Modernization and the unity
between community and the State: implications for
the democratization of rural regions
Classical and Revisionist Liberal, as well as Neo-lib-
eral theories maintain the assumption of unity. In the
light of the emergence of global capitalism, these formu-
lations are problematic vis-a-vis the objective of estab-
lishing free spaces in the rural as they o!er no solutions
to the impasse generated by the nation-state's inability to
control global actors and actions. Traditionally estab-
lished actions in defense of the environment, food con-
sumers, the quality of agricultural production, labor and
other aspects of rural life mandate that the State retain
the possibility of exercising ultimate power within its
political jurisdiction. Once this situation is altered, legit-
imate avenues for the satisfaction of social, economical
and political needs are decreasingly available to indi-
viduals and groups. More importantly, communities "nd
their ability to defend political gains and to establish
desirable conduct of action severely limited.
Instances of the inability of the State to control global
actors and actions and to maintain democratically estab-
lished free spaces abound in rural study's literature (e.g.,
Bonanno and Constance, 1996; He!ernan and Con-
stance, 1991; Gouveia, 1994; Sanderson, 1986; Skladany
and Harris, 1995). For instance, in the case of agro-food
sector, in the United States environmental groups were
successful in introducing legislation which regulated the
killing of endangered marine species by commercial "sh-
ing vessels. Agro-food corporations viewed this demo-
cratically established law as damaging to their economic
interests and decided to by-pass it by re#agging their
boats. By #ying the #ag of a di!erent country, corpora-
tions maintained that their "shing vessels were not
subjects to US laws. Simultaneously, claiming their
American nationality they were able to import their
`foreigna products without paying import tari!s. The US
state, in this case, was unable to defend the spirit of the
law nor was it capable of retaliating against corporations
(Bonanno and Constance, 1996). Similarly, pro-labor and
pro-environmental legislations created increased produc-
tion costs to poultry corporations operating in some
American Midwestern and Southern states. These norms
were bypassed by moving operations to adjacent states
and/or to Central American countries were pro-labor
and pro-environment legislations where either more re-
laxed or simply absent (He!ernan and Constance, 1994).
From a historical viewpoint, Classical Liberalism's
sharing of the unity of State and community is under-
standable as this theory emerged in a period in which the
identity of community and government was a historical
condition of modern Western societies. The Liberal un-
derstanding of the relationship between the State and
community re#ected the process of European nation-
state building which was one of the fundamental aspects
of the expansion of capitalism. European capitalism was
based on the creation of markets contained within politi-
cally independent States. The existence of the State
guaranteed the conditions for the reproduction of emerg-
ing economic relations (Anderson, 1974; Braudel,
1982,1984; Wallerstein, 1979). In this context, Classical
Liberals not only maintained the assumption of unity,
but considered it the central element for the development
of democracy. The power that the community of citizens
delegated to the State was one of the most fundamental
conditions for the free operating of the market and for
protecting citizens from external and internal constraints.
Revisionist Liberalism emerged in a historical situ-
ation in which the economy had clearly transcended its
original national dimension. Multinational and imperial-
ist capitalism, however, represented the expansion of
nationally based corporations into colonized territories
(Brewer, 1980; Spybey, 1996). As the classical accounts of
Hilfeding (1970), Bukharin (1972) and Luxemburg (1972)
indicate, early 20th century imperialism referred to the
constitution of economic and political blocs which met-
ropolitan countries employed to extend domination over
lesser developed countries. World development was char-
acterized by the confrontation between imperialistic
blocs and national capitals that they represented. It fol-
lows that the Revisionist Liberal account of the identity
between community and the State was largely justi"able.
While Revisionist Liberal theories of modernization
grossly misunderstood the conditions and opportunities
of developing societies, in advanced Western societies the
State could still exercise control over social and eco-
nomic processes. As Beck (1992) pointed out, the State's
ability to distribute wealth to all strata of society gave the
impression that the State could forever control the risks
emerging from the evolution of modern society. This was
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particularly the case in rural related sectors such as
agriculture and food where commodity programs, pro-
grams for the enhancement of food quality and food
availability, and other inclusionary measures were imple-
mented through State intervention.
Contemporary Neo-liberal theorists insist on the im-
portance of a minimalist State. Yet their criticisms of the
role of State in society do not acknowledge the State's
emerging limits. For Neo-liberal theorists the State still
fully represents the community of citizens that expresses
it. However, Neo-liberal theorists' call for a minimalist
State makes the issue of the inability of the State to
control social, economic, and non economic environ-
ments much less problematic than in other forms of
liberalism. For them, the hypermobility of capital (Har-
vey, 1990) represents one of the major positive aspects of
Global Post-Fordism. Heeding to the idea that the State
exercises too much control over society (Friedman, 1982;
Hayek, 1973), they consider the fact that State rules are
bypassed by transnational actors as a positive event in
itself. From this viewpoint, the crisis of the nation-state is
an element which strongly contributes to the enhance-
ment of democracy and freedom. Despite these claims,
the issue of democratic political representation forcefully
remains. Following the Liberal tradition, Neo-liberals
maintain that democratic political representation should
be a substantial component of democracy. However, in
their support of globalization they are silent about the
limits that Global Post-Fordism creates for representa-
tion. For them, these limits simply do not exist.
The view of the relationship between the State and
communities expressed by Re#exive Modernization the-
orists is much more complex than that presented by
Neo-liberal thinkers. Re#exive Modernization theorists
are aware of the dislocation between community and
State generated by the evolution of Global Post-For-
dism. For them the State is `squeezed between global and
local processesa. (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 301). This
situation transforms the State in two ways. First, it leaves
political structures with less power to monitor agency
than in the past. Second, it allows for the emergence of
new forms of the State. One form is the supranational
State (e.g., the European Union, the United Nations),
while the other is the creation of autonomous regional
sub-states which are physically smaller than nation-
states yet are endowed with independent powers and
therefore can allow the establishment of free spaces.15
15Despite these considerations, they do not accept the often articu-
lated position of the `end of the Statea. On the contrary, they maintain
that despite its crisis, the `spacea of the State will continue to exist. To
be sure, their emphasis is not on the persistence or disappearance of the
State, but rather on the characteristics of its ongoing transformation.
Indeed, they underscore that the current crisis is a crisis of the nation-
state form of the State, rather than the crisis of the State considered as
a socio-political institution.
According to Lash and Urry, for instance, `the demise of
the nation-state might favor the proliferation of local and
regional states which could more e!ectively respond to
the wishes of its citizens, a much more localist and plural-
ist democracya (1994, p. 325). In this case, it is the cre-
ation of democratic spaces outside the spheres occupied
by the State and/or left vacant by its crisis which moti-
vates optimism in these circles. Indeed, through concepts
such as dialogic democracy (the refusal of power estab-
lished solutions in favor of dialogue-based alternatives)
and life politics (the struggle for the selection of wanted
life styles) (Giddens, 1994), Re#exive Modernization the-
orists indicate the possibility of emancipatory politics
outside traditional arenas and procedures.
The implications that the proposal of Re#exive Mod-
ernization has for the democratization of rural related
activities and sectors are manifold. Their reading of the
crisis of the nation-state indicates that actions of direct
democracy which empower individuals and communities
are historically possible. Emerging community-based ini-
tiatives in favor of alternative forms of agricultural pro-
duction, food consumption, and environmental
protection are examples of Re#exive Modernization the-
orists' ideas about the possibility of establishing an
emancipatory new modernity. Similarly, the insistence on
the availability of organic food, the monitoring of agro-
food production and the enhancement of the quality of
the environment are instances of the emergence of the
aestheticization of social relations and of the related
capacity of individuals to exercise new forms of power.
Indeed, even in a context in which agro-food transna-
tional corporations disproportionally expanded their
powers, their vulnerability vis-a-vis the actions of in-
formed consumers is evident. Recent food boycotts, de-
mands for better food quality, alternative products and
respect of the environment indicate that transnational
corporations' control of markets is a contested matter.
More importantly, they show that corporations' domi-
nance of the agricultural sector still depends on their
ability to `realize their productiona, that is to transform
commodities into money. Here re#exive individuals and
communities, in their roles of consumers, environ-
mentalists, workers, etc., can exercise control of corpo-
rate actions. In essence, This type of democratization of
rural activities implies empowerment of communities as
it shifts powers away from the State apparatus.
Despite Re#exive Modernization's theorists insistence
on the fact that the crisis of the nation-state can be turned
into a proposal for direct democracy, they are also
aware that the question of the monitoring of agency
remains open. More speci"cally, they are aware that
emerging re#exive strategies are, by themselves, not su$-
cient to control unwanted consequences of capitalism.
Re#exive Modernization's theorists are conscious of the
fact that the hypermobility of global economic actors
transcends the political space occupied by subnational
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and/or supranational states (e.g., Harvey, 1990; but also
Lash and Urry, 1994: p. 312; but also Antonio and
Bonanno, 1996; Danley, 1994; Friedland, 1994). Indeed,
they acknowledge that while the ability of new forms of
the state to control economic and non-economic envi-
ronment * albeit expanded * remains at a regional
level, the mobility of capital is global. For rural regions
this fact signi"es an increased inability of the State to
implement emancipatory rural programs and to control
the actions of transnational corporations. This situation
reproposes the crisis of representation as the scope of
action of global actors remains broader than the political
instruments available to citizens to control them. To
paraphrase Beck, the process of representation has exhaus-
ted its capacity to represent.
Furthermore, the ability of communities to exercise
re#exive actions is not independent of their socio-eco-
nomic conditions. In e!ect, the hypermoblity of capital is
possible because of communities' desire to attract corpo-
rate investments (Harvey, 1990; Lash and Urry, 1994). In
this context, more economically and politically advanced
communities and regions are able to control their eco-
nomic and non-economic environments in a much
greater extent than their less developed counterparts.
Because of their relative deprivation, the latter become
much more exposed to the negative consequences of the
crisis of the nation-state and of their diminished ability to
exercise community based re#exive actions. It also ap-
pears clear that conditions for the emergence of new
forms of solidarity* which could bring together di!er-
ent and distant communities* are problematic at best.
It is, perhaps, through the establishment of these global
solidarities that the possibility to generalize re#exive
action across socio-economically unequal contexts could
become a historical reality.
While the observations of Re#exive Modernization
theorists can generate optimism among some, it is obvi-
ous that the crisis of the nation-state implies a crisis of
democracy which is particularly problematic in less-de-
veloped communities and regions. Though partly ac-
knowledged at the theoretical level, this situation is often
overlooked pragmatically as talks about democracy con-
tinue to revolve around Liberal assumptions. Programs
of economic development, protection of the environment,
enhancement of the conditions of disenfranchised groups,
protection of food consumers and other similar initiat-
ives in rural regions call for forms of State intervention
and monitoring based on public support obtained
through direct or indirect representation. Because of the
limits of the State and the related crisis of representation,
it is clear that the issues of `whoma is represented and
`whoa does the monitoring remain largely undetermined.
In this context, e!orts seem to be required at least at
two interrelated levels: theoretically and pragmatically.
Theoretically, a further scrutiny of the concept of democ-
racy seems imperative. In a situation in which many
argue that the end of the cold war has left liberalism as
the only viable form of democracy, the present historical
conditions constitute arguments for rethinking the extent
and meanings of the concept. The contribution of Re#ex-
ive Modernization is a welcome addition. However, at-
tempts which philosophically transcend traditional
liberal understandings of democracy should be rein-
troduced to strengthen the debate. More importantly,
discourses which underscore the limits of the liberal rep-
resentation should gain space. The fracture of the spatial
unity between community and the State leaves little
room for democratic utilizations of this notion. Prag-
matically, too often socially oriented initiatives, such as
community development actions, pro-environmental ini-
tiatives, programs for the enhancement of the quality of
life of rural residents, and programs for the improvement
of the quality of agricultural activities, take for granted
the State's ability to e!ectively represent its citizens and
control unwanted socio-economic events. Though these
initiatives need to continue, it is obvious that their as-
sumptions and directions require scrutiny. The commun-
ity of social scientists is called into question here, as we
play major roles in the task of carrying out e!orts of this
nature. It is to our disciplinary societies and to our
practitioners that the call for critical reevaluation of
assumptions and practice is directed. As pointed out by
John Stuart Mill, the broadening of the debate and the
critical evaluation of alternative proposals constitute the
most fundamental premises for the establishment of sub-
stantive democracy.
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